1 For a discussion of public concern over the soundness of haoks, see Business Week, April 21, 1975, and Forbes, July 1, 1975 . Ooe indication of the concern of investors about the soundness of banks is the rapid decline in bank stock prices front spring to fall of 197-4. Investors got news of the financial difficulties of Franklin National iso May of last year. An index of stock prices of New York City Banks fell at a 63.5 percent annual rate from April to September of 1974, compared to a 52.0 percent rate of decrease in the Standard -and Poor's stock index during the same period. The index of basok stock prices arid the Standard and Poor's 500 composite stock index are presented in an accompanying chart.
2Sassfesrd Rose. "What Really Went Wrong at Franklin National', Fortune (October 1974), pp. 118-21, 220-27. 5 Note that time chart entitled "Bank Failures 1934-7-4" and Table II refer to only those banks that have bees) declared failures by their government supervisors and (10 root inelesde those forced to merge with larger banks disc to financial difficulties even though technically solvent. This distiuetioss accounts for the differences between the observations iso Table I and those in Table II and the "Bank Failesres" chart.
situation threatens to make the Even a conservatively managed bank has limited ability to convert deposits to currency for a large fraction of its depositors. A bank generally cannot use its required reserves for such payments of currency since bank regulatory authorities regard these reserves as essential for a bank's continued operation.
One source of currency for making payments to depositors is from selling assets. When many banks simultaneously experience large currency withdrawals, attempts of banks to obtain currency by selling secusities will tend to drive down the prices of securities. Tf these \runs continue long enough and the market values of securities fall far enough, even the most conservatively managed banks will tend to become insolvent as they suffer losses in liquidating their assets, This process of several bank failures inducing fear of more failures, bank runs, declines in the value of bank assets, and then additional bank failures, occurred in three phases in the early 1930s. The last phase of this process came in the first three months of 19336 As one indication that the public retained its confidence in commercial banks until the fall of 1930, the ratio of bank deposits to currency rose during the period August 1929 to October 1930. ThicJ,pp. 308-309.
Ibid, pp. 308-332. Widespread bank failures were not inevitable in the early 1930s when fear of insolvency of banks spread among bank customers. In the banking crisis of 1907 and in earlier banking crises, banks mutually agreed not to convert deposit balances to currency for their customers. During such periods, the public continued to use bank deposits as money, and banks continued to offer most services, but for a while deposits could not be converted into currency. See Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary History, pp.
156-68. One of the reasons for establishing the Federal
Reserve System was to make such restrictions of conversion from deposits to currency unnecessary since the Federal Reserve was to provide sufficient currency to banks whenever there was a threat of large deposit withdrawals. The One important point to be emphasized from the process that generates widespread hank failures is that when the public loses confidence in the banking industry, forces which cause an individual bank to fail are, in general, independent of its prior investment policies. Both a bank that has invested in risky assets and one that has assumed little risk are vulnerable to failure in such an environment. Therefore, policies designed to deal effectively with widespread bank failures must involve more than simply requiring banks to acquire less risky assets.
Bank Regulatory Response to Widespread

Fa-ilures
The following discussion describes features of the bank regulatory policies which have been developed since the early l930s that deal with the vulnerability of the banking system to widespread failures. Individual features of the regulatory policies are evaluated in other studies; such an evaluation is not the purpose of this paper.°Presentation of bank regulatory policies as an interrelated system designed to prevent bank failures facilitates the analysis below of how proposals for financial reform would influence bank behavior and vulnerability to failure. 
fered through the FDIC. Federal deposit insurance reduces the incentives for bank runs when some events occur which, in the period before deposit insurance, would have made depositors fearful about the safety of their deposits.
Although deposit insurance has been effective in preventing bank runs, prevention of individual failures is also a national policy objective. One important reason for attempting to keep bank failures at a low rate is to keep the payouts from the deposit insurance fund low, thus promoting public confidence in the ability of the deposit insurance fund to meet its obligations. The risks that banks assume must be constrained in some way in order to have a low rate of bank failure. The Federal deposit insurance program is not designed to constrain the incentives for banks to assume risks since the premium rate for deposit insurance does not vary among banks but is a given percentage of insured deposits. Since Federal deposit insurance provides a large degree of safety from bank runs, it may tend to induce banks to hold portfolios of assets with higher risks than if the banking system was less safe from bank runs.
The risks that banks assume are constrained by direct government regulation of hank behavior. A limit is imposed on the maximum loan that each bank can make to one customer which, by regulation, is a fraction of the hank's capital. This regulation may cause banks to diversify their risks to a greater extent than they otherwise would. Banks are restricted from buying corporate stock, and there are some restrictions on the real estate loans that banks can make. Regulators examine banks to determine the quality of their assets and to enforce compliance with all regulations. As part of the examination process, examiners rate the quality of bank management, and occasionally exert pressure to change management. Regulators put pressure on banks to keep their capital-toasset ratios above minimum levels.
10 All of these forms of regulation tend to impose the judgment of regulators on banks, reducing the ability of banks to respond to changing market conditions in investing their assets.
In addition, regulation of bank liabilities involves ceilings on interest rates that banks may pay on time deposits and prohibition of interest on demand deposits. An intent of these regulations is to increase hank profits, to remove the incentives for banks to acquire high risk assets,. and to decrease the volatility of deposits.11 One important influence of this regulation is that levels of interest ceilings in relation to snarket rates influence the ability of banks to attract time deposits. 
Effects of Bank Beg-ulat-io-n o-n Fail-u-res
The bank regulatory scheme developed in the l930s contributed to a reduction in the rate of bank failure to relatively low levels by the early 1 94 Os. No more than 9 banks failed in any one year from 1943 through 1974, compared with approximately 500 failures per year in the 1920s (see accompanying chart) 12 There has been no tendency for bank failures to cause loss of confidence in banks in general and to induce additional failures. The sort of failures that have occurred since the early 1940s have often created public benefits since failure is one process of removing inefficient or dishonest bankers.
Recent Develop-meats in Ba-ak Reg-ulation,
Behav-io-r. and. I-m-plications for Failu-res
Since the early 1940s, bank failures have been caused primarily by embezzlement, fraud, bad management, and assumption of high risks~This section focuses on the risk aspect of bank failures. Several developments in recent years have reduced regulatory constraints on banks without changing incentives for banks to accept risks, and many banks have responded by accepting higher risks. The following discussion includes only a few of the important changes in regulation and bank behavior which have been taking place.
Liability Management -During the 1960s, important changes took place in the sources of bank funds. Some banks began attracting a large share of their deposit liabilities by issuing certificates of deposit, and the volume of transactions in Federal funds was greatly expanded, as shown in the accompanying chart. Banks were given greater freedom to attract funds by issuing large CDs in 1970 when interest ceilings were removed on short-term time deposits of $100,000 or more and in 1973 when interest ceilings were removed on large time deposits of all maturities, Another source of funds that banks began to use dur- 
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ing the late 1960s was that of bank related commercial paper, which is sold by subsidiaries of banks or bank holding companies (see chart).
Banks which attract large shares of their funds from sources that are not fully insured are vulnerable to losing such funds quickly if investors discover that those banks are having financial difficulties.14 Therefore, many banks have become more vulnerable to liquidity crises due to their practices of attracting large shares of their funds for investment by issuing large CDs and by borrowing in the Federal funds market. (1) Lending limits the largest loan binks can make to ins one customer were increased for many banks (2) N itional banks were given gi e'iter freedom in m il-ang reil estate loins (3) The types of general obligation bonds of state and local governments that national banks could underwrite were expanded.
(4) National banks were allowed to count longterm debt which is subordinated to deposit liabilities as part of their capital.
35 In cases of bank liquidation, holders of subordinated debt receive payment only if all depositors receive full payment. Previously, bank regulators considered only equity capital to be hank capital.
The first three changes listed above influence the riskiness of assets that banks may acquire. Regulations concerning debt as bank capital also have several important implications for the risk exposure of banks. Suppose that for some reason a bank has a large reduction in the value of its' assets. The feasibility of the hank accumulating enough capital out of retained earnings to again be considered a viable or- 
Sources of Funds for Banks Engaged in Liability Management
ganization by regulators could depend upon how much debt the bank has in its capital structure. Interest payments on debt capital and its ultimate retirement are obligations that the bank must meet in order to remain solvent, whereas dividend payments can he postponed, and there is no obligation to retire equity capital. Another implication of regulators considering long-term debt to be bank capital is that banks can increase their lending limits by issuing such debt, since lending limits are based upon the total capital accounts of banks.
Acquisision~sof Nonbank-ing Finn-,s by BI-ICs -Another recent development which has implications for the risks of bank failures is the acquisition of nonbanking firms by bank holding companies (BHCs). Since 1970 the Federal Reserve Board has had the responsibility of determining the activities in which BHCs may engage.ie Table III lists the currently approved activities. The expansion of BHCs into nonbanking industries creates possibilities for financial difficulties of nonbanking subsidiaries to adversely affect hank subsidiaries. Many customers of a subsidiary bank may withdraw their deposits if a nonbank subsidiary of the BHC experiences financial difficulties. One reason for depositors of a subsidiary bank to start a run on the bank is they may assume 5 'In 1956 the Federal Reserve Board received legislative authority to regulate the acquisitions of finns that own controlling interest in two or more banks. These holding companies were not allowed to engage in activities other than banking. FIolding companies owning only one bank were free to make whatever acquisitions of nonbanking firms they wanted before 1970. The BHC Act of 1970 gives the Federal Rescue Board authority to regulate the acquisition of all BHCs with the possibility of BHCs acquiring firms in industries other than banking which the Board rules to be closely related to banking. BHCs must get prior approval from the Board for each such acquisition. that the subsidiary bank has made the same bad investment decisions as the nonbank subsidiary. Another reason depositors may react in that way is because they may assume that the subsidiary bank will use its resources to help the nonbank subsidiary in financial difficulty, even though several regulations restrain subsidiary banks from taking -such actions.
Ratio Suite
The possible risks to banks of affiliation with a BHC are illustrated in the case of the Beverly Hills National Bank and its parent corporation. The BHC had financed large loans to a real estate developer by selling its own commercial paper. When the real estate developments became unprofitable, the BHC had difficulty refinancing its commercial paper debt. The bank lost deposits as the financial position of the BHC became more widely known, although the bank itself was solvent according to the analysis of the Comptroller of the Currency. The holding company sold its interest in the hank to the WelLs Fargo Bank to pay off its debts.mr
Other Causes of-Recent Bank
Failures -It is difficult to determine the role of the above changes in regulations and bank behavior in the recent bank failures because there have been several other forces at work, The recent recession began in the fall of 1973, and it is during recession periods that large loan losses make some banks insolvent. Historical evidence in the accompanying chart indicates a tendency for bank failures to rise when the rate of economic activity declines. In addition, the risks of speculation in foreign exchange have been greater since 1971 when the world monetary system was switched from fixed to floating exchange rates. The failure of Franklin National provides an example of the influence that foreign exchange speculation can have on bank earnings and capital.
Some Recent Proposals for Further Relaxation of Co-nstraints on Bank Behavior
Proposals for financial reform which have received much attention in the past few years may indicate the future course of bank regulation. Proposals for financial reform by the Hunt Commission call for relaxation of several banking regulations which affect various types of activities in which banks may engage and the types of assets they may acquire.
tm8 The
Financial Institutions Act of 1975 proposes similar relaxation of regulations on real estate loans and community development projects.
Neither group of proposals for financial reform would alter the way in which deposit insurance premiums are calculated. Therefore, these proposals, like several changes in regulation in recent years, would move the banking system in the direction of fewer constraints without reducing the incentives of banks to accept high risks; the degree to which such proposals would affect bank safety is uncertain.
RECONCILING BANK SAFETY WITH RELAXATION OF REGULATiONS
Bank regulation has changed in recent years to give banks greater freedom in attracting funds and selecting assets, and proposals currently under consideration indicate that there may be fewer regulatory constraints on banks in the future. However, if a low rate of hank failure and a solvent deposit insurance fund also continue to be important objectives of public policy, new forms of bank regulation must be implemented to restrain the risks that some banks would be induced to assume. (2) special statutory and regulatory restrictions on real estate loans be abolished; (3) commercial banks he permitted to invest in any assets sip to 3 percent of total assets or 30 percent of capital, surplus, amid undivided profits, whichever is less; (4 1 authority to underwrite reversue bonds he expanded; 5) eOismnsercial banks be permitted to make equity investmerits in coniniunity rehabilitation amid development corporations in amounts up to 5 percent of capital, surplus, arid undivided profits. These objectives could be achieved through a program of charging banks deposit insurance premiums based upon the risks they assume.'°Regulation of bank behavior could be eliminated. Individual banks would be free to choose the degrees of risk they prefer. Most banks would probably not accept high risks if deposit insurance premiums were set high enough to compensate the deposit insurance fund for the risks involved, Whatever would be the choices of banks in accepting risks, the most important consideration is that public confidence in the capacity of the deposit insurance fund to meet its obligations prevents bank runs, and under this plan the solvency of the insurance fund would be protected by charging banks premiums that are high enough to cover their risks of failure.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
The Hunt Commission Report presents the common arguments against variable deposit insurance premiums in tise following quote:
The Commission rejected the variable rate proposal. It recognizes that differences in risk of failure exist and that its recommendation for liberalizing the regulations relating to the asset, liability and capital structures of financial institutions would probably increase these differences. The problem is a practical one. The Commission does not see how differences in risks can be evaluated with sufficient precision to be adequately reflected in insurance assessments. Further, the Commission believes that assessments might be used, albeit unintentionally, to penalize innovative institutions. New and different functions might be regarded as high risk functions.
Finally, knowledge that some institutions were paying higher assessments than others could weaken public confidence in those institutions, which would defeat the purpose insurance was designed to achieve. 20 Sam Peltzman has answers for these arguments. 21
The evaluation of assets by bank examiners could be used as the basis for setting deposit insurance premiums, As to the argument that innovative institutions would be penalized with higher insurance premiums, Peltzman maintains that such penalties would be only temporary until the insurance agency would adjust the premiums to actual experience. Peltzman also argues that with information on deposit insurance premiums becoming public knowledge, banks would have strong incentives to cater to the degree of risk aversion desired by their depositors.
SUMMARY
An appropriate objective of public policy regarding bank regulation is prevention of widespread bank failures. The money stock and tank credit have declined during past periods of widespread bank failures, disrupting economic activity. In the past, large numbers of banks have failed when some events, such as the failure of several banks or one large bank, made depositors fearful about the soundness of all banks, inducing them to demand currency for their deposits. That response tended to make even more people fearful about the soundness of their banks, creating runs on banks.
In this country the most recent experience with widespread bank failures was in the period 1930-33, Current regulatory policies were largely developed in the 1930s in response to that experience. A central feature of these policies is Federal deposit insurance, which has greatly reduced the risks of bank runs. The deposit insurance premiums of banks are calculated as a given percentage of insured deposits. The risks that insured banks assume are controlled by direct regulation of bank behavior.
In recent years there has been some relaxation of bank regulation, giving banks greater freedom to compete in attracting deposits and investing their assets. However, there have been no changes in regulatory policies which would induce banks to restrain the risks they assume. If it is in the public interest to relax direct regulation of the risks that banks may assume and yet keep the bank failure rate low and the deposit insurance fund solvent, one appropriate change in policy would he to begin charging each bank a deposit insurance premium based upon the risks that it assumes. Such a policy would give banks greater freedom to respond to market forces in investing their assets while reducing their incentives to assume high risks. The premiums would be set high enough to compensate the insurance fund for the risks of failure that banks assume.
